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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In this essay, I argue for a simple claim: In the U.S. today, those 
in political office have affirmative obligations to seek out and listen 
to the widest and most diverse possible range of people affected by 
government action, policy, law, and regulation.  This obligation aris-
es most proximately from the unequal distribution of lobbying power 
among the populace in combination with the legal, ethical, and prac-
tical problems with the state imposing constraints on lobbying. Ulti-
mately, the affirmative obligation to listen, and listen widely, is root-
ed in the goal of wise and just democratic governance.  
 Three features characterize the practice of lobbying in the United 
States today.  Professional lobbying is commonplace, Constitutionally 
protected from robust regulation, and wildly unequally distributed 
across the population. Due to these features, lobbying can impinge on 
successful democratic governance in at least three ways. By narrow-
ing the factual and informational basis for governmental action, lob-
bying promotes stupidity. By impeding fair service to the entire pop-
ulace, lobbying contributes to injustice. By diminishing popular con-
tributions to representative governance, lobbying delegitimizes puta-
tively democratic governments.  
 This essay assumes that lobbying is here to stay and that its Con-
stitutional protections are proper as a matter of law, politics, and 
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ethics.  Furthermore, this paper assumes that there is nothing un-
ethical about professional lobbyists or individuals or associations ro-
bustly seeking to influence, educate, or assist legislative, executive or 
administrative officials by providing these officials with arguments, 
information, and draft language for statutes or regulations.  Like-
wise, there is nothing unethical about professional lobbyists or any-
body else contacting political officials in person or by other means. 
While this paper assumes that any given position advanced by a par-
ticular lobby or the style in which it is conveyed may well be unethi-
cal, this paper also assumes that it is neither legally nor practically 
feasible to regulate the content of the positions taken by lobbyists. 
Nor is it legally or practically feasible to impose too many rules on 
the various methods used by lobbyists as they communicate with po-
litical officials. 
 But…. Neither the ubiquity and staying power of lobbying and or-
ganized lobbies nor the justified protection of lobbying from legal 
regulation should make us complacent about the potentially corro-
sive effects of lobbying on American politics.  Lobbying can lead to 
unfair or poorly informed legislation or executive action. Lobbying 
can thereby make elected officials bad at their jobs.  This essay pro-
ceeds on two more assumptions. First, it is bad, ethically and other-
wise, for elected officials to be bad at their jobs, particularly for them 
to act unjustly or stupidly. Second, officeholders have an ethical obli-
gation to do their jobs as well as possible.  
 From a more systemic point of view, the state of lobbying today 
exacerbates the difficulty of maintaining a meaningful communica-
tive connection between most of the governed and their government. 
In modern large-scale postindustrial democracies this connection is 
fragile. It is too easy for popular participation in politics and law-
making to amount to nothing more than a formalistic or ritualized 
trip to the ballot box, if that.  Indeed, permitting the collective action 
represented by professional lobbyists is one antidote to this. But pro-
fessional lobbying requires financial resources and other prerequi-
sites not available to all persons whose participation is necessary to 
legitimate the actions taken by a democratic state. 
 How can individual officeholders prevent lobbying from making 
them bad at their jobs? How can today’s office-holders address sys-
temic erosion of the communicative connection between the governed 
and the government? What measures may they ethically take? What 
measures, if any, must they? At the conclusion of this essay, I pro-
vide some preliminary answers to these questions. In the interim, I 
turn to the historical practice from which today’s lobbying emerged, 
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petitioning the government for redress of grievances. A close look at 
the specifics of that practice shows that petitioning helped govern-
ment officials fulfill affirmative obligations to listen widely and re-
sponsively. It may well be impossible to reproduce exactly the histor-
ical practices of petitioning the government, although I will suggest 
some modern tools that might be used to enable modern variants. By 
seeing how officials in the past have met, at least to some extent, 
their affirmative obligations to listen, we gain a point of departure 
for considering how today’s officials might do likewise. By appreciat-
ing how widespread petitioning was and how seriously it inflected 
Anglo-American government as it evolved into representative democ-
racy, we can better gauge what is lost when government officials do 
not make sure they listen widely and actively.  While today’s Consti-
tutional protections for lobbying originate in an older right to peti-
tion the government for redress of grievances, the actual practice 
codified in the right grounds a much richer conception of how asser-
tively officials should seek out and listen to the governed, particular-
ly those not already speaking through lobbyists. 
II. PETITIONING VERSUS LOBBYING
 Today’s lobbying has its roots in a very old, somewhat different 
Anglo-American political practice: petitioning.  Petitioning emerged 
in England in the 14th century and developed into its heyday there 
in the 17th and 18th centuries.1 Transplanted to the British Ameri-
can colonies, petitioning developed a distinctively American demo-
cratic character, dating from colonial times up until the mid-1800s, 
when petitioning as a democratic communicative practice foundered 
under the conditions that precipitated the U.S. Civil War.2 An exam-
ination of petitioning demonstrates how today’s government officials 
could correct for the problems created by professional lobbying by 
undertaking affirmative efforts to listen to more of the population 
more systematically.  
 Because of the long history of petitioning and its practice across 
time and place, its cultural, political, and legal meanings admit of 
varying interpretations.  Fine-grained examinations of particular in-
stances, periods, or locales will show different dimensions of the 
practice in particular moments and settings.  Nevertheless, some 
broad features can be grasped from a historical overview of the prac-
tice. The development of petitioning in England from the fourteenth 
1 Infra Part II.A. 
2 Infra Part II.B & II.C. 
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to the seventeenth centuries illustrates the emergence of a communi-
cative practice, as petitioners insisted on their right to speak to and 
be heeded by the government and the government insisted that it be 
spoken to nonviolently and without menace.3  In colonial America, 
the simultaneous creation of local legislative bodies and the practice 
of petitioning them indicate how petitioning fostered democratic gov-
ernance in the colonies prior to the Revolutionary War and before the 
later expansion of suffrage to men of color and then to women.4 Peti-
tioning was not transcendentally democratic in the more monarchical 
periods of English history, but it did in a very practical way show pe-
titioners, kings, and parliaments alike the significance of meaningful 
voice for the governed.  Likewise, petitioning was not a substitute for 
enfranchisement in colonial America or the newly minted United 
States, but its availability and use by nonvoting members of the 
community made it practically evident that elected officials had obli-
gations to hear and act on behalf of people who could not have voted 
for them. Democratic representation was not accomplished simply 
through the ballot box, but by government being accessible and re-
sponsive to those who were not legally permitted to cast a ballot and 
available to all between elections. 
A. Petitioning in England Before the American Revolution 
 In England, the practice of petitioning predates its famous codifi-
cation in Magna Carta, which was signed in 1215. Petitioning was 
part of feudal English life, particularly after the Norman Conquest, 
when English feudalism became administratively organized.5 By the 
time Magna Carta identified petitioning as a right, the practice had 
been underway in England, in various forms, for at least two centu-
ries.6  
 In the feudal context, petitioning both empowered and restrained 
the king vis-à-vis other feudal lords.  The king had the authority to 
hear petitions from the findings of his subordinate lords but did not 
have direct authority over original petitions from those lower down 
the feudal hierarchy.7  For present purposes, this two-facetedness – 
legitimator of authority and constraint on authority – is central. 
3 Infra Part II.A.  
4 Infra Part II.B. 
5 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, Feudalism in England, in A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 516-520 (Little, Brown & Co., 5th ed. 1956) (1929). 
6 Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance of the Right to 
Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2163 (1998); see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Down-
sizing the Right To Petition, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 745 (1999).  
7 Guy I. Seidman, The Origins of Accountability: Everything I Learned About the Sover-
eign’s Immunity, I Learned from King Henry III, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 393, 421 (2005). 
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While petitioning may not have been designed for or experienced as a 
mechanism of personal autonomy for petitioners,8 the practice medi-
ated the relationship between two loci of power in feudal England: 
the king and the lords. Giving the king the authority to hear peti-
tions based on findings made by lords legitimated the king’s authori-
ty over those lords.  Limiting the king’s reach to petitions already re-
viewed by lords constrained the king’s power.  Likewise, the lords’ 
power was legitimated as they were the first authority over petitions, 
but it was constrained by the authority of the king to review their de-
terminations. 
 
 Magna Carta made clear both facets of petitioning. As codified, 
petitioning was a procedural device barons could use to ensure that 
the sovereign complied with the substantive provisions of the char-
ter.9 At the same time, Magna Carta assured the king that so long as 
he complied, the barons would finance his undertakings.10 Petitioning 
providing a nonviolent channel for constraining an overreaching 
king, while at the same time recognizing his power to collect reve-
nues from the nobility.11 
 
 As the crown’s need for funds grew, so did the practice of petition-
ing.  Knights and burgesses gained the opportunity to petition the 
king and kings gave them audiences at which to be heard.12 As feu-
dalism broke down, petitioning expanded further, simultaneously ex-
tending the reach and depth of the crown’s administrative authority 
and making it somewhat accountable to more of the crown’s sub-
jects.13 Petitions became conduits of information about situations 
throughout the realm and opportunities for input into royal policy 
and decisions.14 
  
 After Magna Carta, petitions came to dominate and even set the 
agenda of the English Parliament.15 While petitioners themselves 
chose their audience – the King, the House of Commons, or the 
                                                                                                                       
8 Mark, supra note 6, at 2163-64. 
9 Gary, supra note 6, at 746. 
10 Id. at 746. 
11 See Mark, supra note 6, at 2165-66. 
12 Gary, supra note 6, at 746; Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amend-
ment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 23 (1993). 
13 Gary, supra note 6, at 746; Norman B. Smith, ‘Shall Make No Law Abridging …’: An 
Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 
1155 (1986). 
14 Mark, supra note 6, at 2165-2166. 
15 Id. at 2167. 
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courts – Parliament became a popular pick, partly because Parlia-
ment, seeking to expand its own authority vis-à-vis the Crown, un-
dertook to hear and ensure response to as many petitions as possi-
ble.16  Furthermore, because the King’s access to funding depended 
on his hearing petitions referred to him from Parliament, it amplified 
popular petitions when they were presented to the King via Parlia-
ment.17  
 
 By the sixteenth century, “[p]etitioning came to be regarded as 
part of the Constitution, that fabric of political customs which de-
fined English rights.”18 The right and practice of petition was set 
within a hierarchical society, to be sure, but the existence of petition-
ing established, enacted, and entrenched the reciprocity of obliga-
tions between those higher and lower in the social and political or-
der.19 
 
 Petitioning played an important role in the fractious political 
events of seventeenth century England, including the Civil War and 
English Revolution.20 Amidst the power struggles, petitioning did not 
disappear. Even rejections of petitions served to strengthen the prac-
tice, particularly when the rejections were based on formal rather 
than substantive considerations.  In these situations, the authority 
petitioned did not deny the right to address it nor its obligation to 
take heed.  Rather it specified the acceptable form a petition had to 
take: it had to address a recognized authority, state a defined griev-
ance, and pray for relief.21  A petition was a discrete political and le-
gal instrument for seeking justice.22 
 
 This understanding and operation of petitioning in England flow-
ered at the same time the British colonies in North America did. Co-
lonial petitioning grew up informed by the English practice. What 
really distinguished American petitioning from its English counter-
part, though, was the creation of a new kind of audience for petitions, 
an audience that was eager to establish itself as a political and legal 
authority: colonial assemblies, the forerunners of today’s state legis-
latures and the prototype for today’s federal legislative branch. 
                                                                                                                       
16 Id. at 2168. 
17 Id. at 2168. 
18 Id. at 2169. 
19 Id. at 2169. 
20 Id. at 2170-71. 
21 Id. at 2173. 
22 Id. at 2174. 
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B. Petitioning in the American Colonies 
 The American colonies came into being via different mechanisms 
and with different governance structures.  The British saw the origi-
nal colonies more as proprietary corporate enterprises rather than as 
new political units.  Thus, colonies were founded with a delineated 
executive but no local representative body.  Nevertheless, within a 
decade or two of their formation in the 1600s, each colony ended up 
with an assembly.23 Eventually, each assembly became a representa-
tive legislature. All the assemblies came to be lawmaking bodies dis-
tinct from the executive. The assemblies were composed of a subset of 
a colony’s inhabitants.24 During the eighteenth century, assemblies 
developed into institutions organized to address the concerns of the 
populations they represented.25  To accomplish this mission, much of 
the colonial assemblies’ time was spent dealing with petitions. The 
typical response to a petition was the passage of a bill addressing the 
concern it raised.26 As the assemblies became more sophisticated and 
organized, they created standing committees, some dedicated exclu-
sively to the business of hearing and addressing petitions.27 Petitions 
flowed to the colonial assemblies throughout the seventeenth centu-
ry, increasing in most colonies during the eighteenth.28  The propor-
tion of statutes based on petitions increased as well. During the 
eighteenth century, petitions were the basis for about half the bills 
passed by colonial assemblies.29 Note the very direct connection, 
therefore, between legislation and popular concerns, a connection 
forged by the mechanism of petition. 
 
 By hearing and addressing a wide variety of grievances, colonial 
assemblies gained information30 and legitimized their lawmaking au-
thority.31 Through petitions, colonial legislatures learned about topics 
ranging from local welfare needs (such as care for orphans and the 
ill) to local abuse of official power (such as excessive taxation or cor-
ruption).32 The richness of information contained in petitions was en-
hanced by the fact that petitions were submitted from a wide cross-
                                                                                                                       
23 PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LEGISLATURES: COLONIES, 
TERRITORIES, AND STATES, 1619 – 2009, at 11 (2012). 
24 Id. at 12-15. 
25 Id. at 27. 
26 Id. at  28.  
27 Id. at  40-46; Gary, supra note 6, at 751. 
28 SQUIRE, supra note 23, at 68. 
29 Id. at 68; see also Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition, 96 
YALE L. J. 142, 144 (1986). 
30 Higginson, supra note 29, at 147, 153-155. 
31 Id. at 145; Gary, supra note 6, at 749. 
32 Higginson, supra note 29, at 154. 
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section of the population, including women, native Americans, felons, 
and slaves.33 This expansive base for petition-based legislation ex-
tended representation beyond the population who selected or were 
from the same background as the assembly members. Laws had a 
more popular base than they would if they stemmed only from com-
munication among the representatives themselves or between repre-
sentatives and established political elites. 
 
 Dating from 1680 in Massachusetts, a number of colonial charters 
expressly included the right to petition.34 By the time of the Revolu-
tionary War, so did the charters of Delaware, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina and Vermont.35 In all the colonies, petitioning was used and 
recognized as way for individuals to participate in government. Colo-
nial assemblies, rather than royally appointed governors or judges, 
became the focus of colonists’ petitions.36 
C. Petitioning in the United States of America 
 After Independence, petitioning continued at the new national 
level.  During the first fifty years of the Union, Congress acted much 
like colonial legislatures did, handling petitions on a wide range of 
subjects and using committees to manage their volume and variety. 
Petitioning continued to serve as a mechanism that simultaneously 
informed political officeholders about concerns of the populace and 
made government responsive to the people. 
 
 As the nineteenth century progressed, the issue of slavery came to 
dominate petitions to Congress.37  Congress was flooded with peti-
tions calling for abolition. Eventually, Southern politicians, frustrat-
ed by constant anti-slavery petitions, made the issue into one of 
states’ rights, with John C. Calhoun arguing that petitions about 
slavery to the federal Congress intruded, in principle, into matters 
reserved to individual states to decide.38 Calhoun fervently objected 
to the Senate hearing petitions from Northerners on the subject of 
slavery in the South.39 Abolitionists avoided this sectarian maneuver 
                                                                                                                       
33 Id. at 153. 
34 Gary, supra note 6, at 749. 
35 Id. at 749. 
36 Id.; Higginson, supra note 29, at 150-51. 
37 Higginson, supra note 29, at 143-44, 157-58. 
38 Id. at 159-60. 
39 See John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions (Feb. 6, 1837), re-
printed in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 461, 463-
64 (Ross M. Lence ed. 1992).  In response to introduction of anti-slavery petitions by sena-
tors from Indiana, Ohio, Vermont, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, Cal-
houn characterized the petitions as denunciations of the South, which depended on slavery 
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by focusing their petitions on Washington, D.C., a polity governed di-
rectly at the federal level and one where slavery was legal.40 Mean-
while John Quincy Adams rejected the contention that only local in-
habitants could petition on local or regional matters.  Regardless of 
Constitutional limitations on the remedies the federal government 
could put into place, people had independent rights to communicate 
their grievances and have them considered.41 Nevertheless, in 1840, 
the House of Representatives adopted internal procedures to stop the 
inflow of abolitionist petitions.  
  
 Thus, the same tensions that undid peaceful preservation of the 
Union  ended a political and legal practice that had been a feature of 
Anglo-American governance for centuries, a practice that both re-
flected and fostered democratic, representative popular sovereignty. 
Up until Congress gagged petitions related to slavery, the Anglo-
American history of petitioning models a two-way channel of com-
munication, a way of connecting the governed and the governors.  Pe-
titions and responses forged a shared understanding of the needs, 
desires, and interests between parties on either side of the process. 
The demise of petitioning the federal legislature presaged resort to 




 After the Civil War, the prior practice of petitioning the federal 
legislature died out completely. The U.S. Supreme Court construed 
the right narrowly, basically treating it as coextensive with rights of 
free speech and association42 and therefore as not giving rise to a 
Constitutional obligation on the part of government to actually listen 
or respond to petitions. This has preserved the constitutional right of 
                                                                                                                       
for its economic well-being.  Id. at 463-64, 466, 472, 475 (“We of the South will not, cannot, 
surrender our institutions. … I look not for aid to this [federal] Government, or to the other 
States.…  If we [Southern states] do not defend ourselves none shall defend us….”). 
40 Id. at 161. 
41 Id. at 162-64. 
42 See, e.g., McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (holding that the right to petition, 
like other First Amendment rights, does not confer an absolute immunity from prosecution 
on those who exercise the right); see also CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND 
INTERPRETATION 1351-52 (S. Doc. No. 112-9, 2013), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2013/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2013.pdf (“Later cases 
tend to merge the rights of assembly and petition into the speech and press clauses, and, 
indeed, all four rights may well be considered as elements of an inclusive right to freedom 
of expression. While certain conduct may still be denominated as either petition or assem-
bly rather than speech, there seems little question that similar standard will be applied in 
most cases.” (footnotes omitted)). 
10  LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX:000 
 
people to speak to the government but has eliminated the double fac-
eted nature of such speech. Absent the right to be heeded, speech 
stops serving as two-way channel for mutual edification. The gov-
ernment may be prohibited from interfering with anybody’s effort to 
send it a bulletin but it has no legal obligation to respond or even at-
tend to any or every bulletin sent its way. 
 
 While some scholars dispute the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Petitions Clause, the Court’s narrow judicial treatment of peti-
tioning has opened a gap between our judicially determined Consti-
tutional law of lobbying and a communicative ethics of lobbying. The 
judicial treatment could and perhaps may eventually be changed to 
accord with the ethical approach I advocate here, but regardless of 
judicial understanding of the constitutional protections and respon-
sibilities around petitioning the government, the ethics of lobbying, 
and particularly the ethical obligations of those subject to lobbying, is 
an independent matter. 
 
III.    THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF BEING LOBBIED 
 The foregoing overview of petitioning in England, colonial Ameri-
ca, and the young United States is not meant to demand a reintro-
duction of particular historical practices into the United States to-
day. Rather, the historical review of the practices highlights im-
portant features missing from today's politics, particularly the avail-
ability of a widespread, popular mechanism to communicate infor-
mation and concerns to those in government and an inbuilt dynamic 
of responsiveness to communications from all quarters of the popula-
tion.  How might government officials today incorporate these fea-
tures into day to day governance? By appreciating, acknowledging, 
and actively fulfilling an affirmative obligation to listen widely and 
responsively. 
 
 With the decline of a robust and populist system of petitioning the 
government for redress of grievances, it falls in the first instance to 
individual representatives to make sure that they get wide-ranging 
and meaningful opportunities to listen constructively to those they 
govern.  There are some simple steps a representative could take.  He 
might block out periods of time for appointments with those who are 
not represented by paid or professional lobbyists.  He could advertise 
the weeks or months during which he or his staff are only available 
to associations and individuals speaking on their own behalf.  A sin-
gle official could go further.  He could have one staff person dedicated 
not just to the usual “constituent services” but to acquiring infor-
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mation from those affected by the official’s decisions and from outside 
experts knowledgeable in relevant areas. 
 
 In the absence of institutionalized mechanisms for hearing from 
and attending to sources other than those already speaking, and es-
pecially other than those who have the resources and skills to get 
heard relatively easily, individual representatives have obligations to 
do what they can to widen their circle of communicative action.  Such 
individual efforts may be limited in their overall effect, however.  
Depending on the part of government in which they serve or other 
political associations available to them, officials could create more 
systematic devices for ensuring wide-ranging and diverse listening. 
Whatever the Supreme Court may say is constitutionally required 
with regard to hearing and responding to petitions to redress griev-
ances, Congress can act to go beyond any judicially described mini-
mum.  Congress could use its power to hold fact-finding inquiries 
more responsibly and differently than it has tended to in recent 
times, with committees operating to seek out and absorb information 
and viewpoints not necessarily represented by professional lobby-
ists.43 
 
 One reason often given for officials’ tendency not to take the initi-
ative to expand the circle of those to whom they listen is a limitation 
on resources.  The creation of legislative law clerkships, a concrete 
proposal currently before Congress, could help remedy this problem.44  
Advocated by a coalition of legal academics, law school deans, law 
students, lawyers, policy makers, and legislative staff members, the 
Congressional clerkship program would operate similarly to judicial 
clerkships and executive branch fellowships offered to outstanding 
                                                                                                                       
43 Some political scientists see even recent Congressional hearings as broadening the 
sources from which Congress obtains information. Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba 
& Henry E. Brady, Who Speaks Loudly in Washington? And Who Isn’t Heard at All?, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2012, at K1 (“Congressional hearings can also play a corrective 
role. Though they sometimes seem like political theater, hearings, on average, bring in a 
broader range of voices and interests than does lobbying. Financial resources are less cen-
tral to participation, and the initiative rests more with policy makers in Congress than 
with the organizations. Business interests, which account for nearly three-quarters of the 
dollars expended on lobbying, are a much smaller share of the testimonies at hearings—
less than one-third. Congressional policy makers could make even greater efforts to ensure 
that hearings include all voices.”) 
44 For general information see the website for the Congressional Clerkship Coalition, 
About the Initiative, http://www.congressionalclerkship.com/p/learn-more.html (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2014); see also Daniel Webster Congressional Clerkship Act of 2013, S. 1458, 
113th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, Aug. 1, 2013), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1458/text. 
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recent law school graduates.45 Professor Robin West, former associate 
dean of Georgetown University Law Center, called for such a pro-
gram in an article published in 2006.46 Another early backer of such a 
program was Dean Larry Kramer of Stanford Law School.47 Clerks 
with legal educations could also improve the political quality of legis-
lation by ensuring that it rests on better, more complete background 
knowledge of the issues and the impact on all those affected by pro-
posed bills.48 Advocates of a legislative clerkship program emphasize 
that these clerkships should not be duplicative of current legislative 
staff positions. As Professor Dakota Rudesill puts it, a legislative 
clerkship should consist of at least one “year of intensive legal work 
on bills, hearings, or chamber procedure.”49 The Congressional Clerk-
ship initiative illustrates how one part of government whose mem-
bers are regularly professionally lobbied could institute a systemic 
program with a work force - law clerks - far more insulated from di-
rect lobbying than members or their staffs.  Similar clerkship pro-
grams might make sense for administrative agencies. 
 
 Whether conducted individually or by a corps of clerks, affirma-
tive listening can take advantage of simple, comparatively low cost 
tools for soliciting input and feedback online. Small businesses seek-
ing more authentic communication with customers turn to simple 
online polls and surveys.50 Local, state, and federal officeholders 
could do the same, taking advantage of freely available advice about 
how to use email, online surveys, user forums, widgets and off-the-
shelf data analytics tools to gather meaningful, useful ideas and re-
                                                                                                                       
45 Dakota S. Rudesill, Keepers of the U.S. Code: The Case for a Congressional Clerkship 
Program, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS, Nov. 5, 2008, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1273943 . 
46 Robin West, A Response to Goodwin Liu, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 157, 161 (2006)  
(West argued for the benefits of having clerks focused on aiding lawmakers’ efforts to enact 
Constitutionally required and Constitutionally permitted laws). 
47 See The Daniel Webster Congressional Clerkship Initiative, STAN. L. SCHOOL BLOG (April 
7, 2011), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/newsfeed/2011/04/07/the-daniel-webster-
congressional-clerkship-initiative/. 
48 Dakota S. Rudesill describes how law clerks could enhance the operations of Congress. 
Rudesill, supra note 45 (“Even where expert Members and staff are involved, unforgiving 
time pressures and varied responsibilities mean that too often basic legislative work gets 
short shrift.  During my years on the Hill, I often saw amendments filed (and even passed) 
that were decidedly unclear about what was being amended or the net effect of the new 
law.  A law clerk or two at key committees and Member offices dedicated to legislative re-
search, analysis, and drafting-a keeper of the U.S. Code, if you will-would be valuable in-
deed.”). 
49 Rudesill, supra note 45.  
50 See Elizabeth Cotner, Online Tools To Solicit Feedback From Customers, NFIB (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.nfib.com/article/online-tools-to-solicit-feedback-from-customers-56093/. 
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actions from individuals.51  While some tools directed toward con-
sumers might well have to be adapted to facilitate valuable commu-
nication between citizens and officials, these resources specifically 
demonstrate how the internet enables willing, eager listeners to cre-
ate opportunities for people who want to speak to them to make 
themselves heard.  Politicians increasingly rely on the internet to 
raise money and rally support for themselves: they could turn that 
expertise to encouraging people to tell them about their concerns and 
their views. 
 
 The foregoing operational suggestions are preliminary ideas for 
how today’s legislators and other government officials might fulfill 
their affirmative obligations to listen.  They illustrate how listening 
widely and actively could be institutionalized under current circum-
stances. Officeholders and their staffs might well devise different, 
and better, mechanisms were they focused on meeting the obligation. 
Or they might find contemporary vehicles by which people could re-
turn to petitioning the government. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
  In the twenty-first century, lobbyists in the United States con-
tinue to root their profession in the Constitutionally guaranteed right 
to petition the government for redress of grievances.52 The history of 
the practice underlying this right evidences the downsides of today’s 
lobbying.  When professional lobbyists dominate communication with 
the government, lobbying does not afford officials the wide range of 
input historically achieved through the petitioning process.  Correla-
tively, the narrowed bases for today’s lobbying means that official re-
sponsiveness to lobbies creates concerns about capture and unfair-
ness, in contrast to the way in which petitioning made government 
accountable even to groups and persons deprived of the ballot. 
                                                                                                                       
51 See, e.g., Josh Catone, 9 Web Apps for Gathering Customer Feedback, MASHABLE (Mar. 6, 
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/03/06/user-feedback-apps/; Gregory Ciotti, The 7 Best 
Ways To Gather Customer Feedback, HELPSCOUT (June 19, 2013), 
https://www.helpscout.net/blog/customer-feedback/. 
52 See, for example, the mission statement of the Association of Government Relations Pro-
fessionals (AGRP). Association of Government Relations Professionals, AGRP Mission and 
Strategic Plan, http://grprofessionals.org/about-association-government-relations-
professionals/agrp-mission-and-strategic-plan/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (“We believe in 
the Constitutionally-protected right of freedom of speech, the public’s right to petition gov-
ernment, and the right of all Americans to be represented before government.”). Until Oc-
tober 2013, the AGRP was known as the American League of Lobbyists. See Press Release, 
American League of Lobbyists, The Board of the American League of Lobbyists (ALL) 
Votes To Recommend Its New Brand: “Association of Government Relations Professionals” 
(AGRP) (Oct. 15, 2013), http://grprofessionals.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Rebrand-PR-
10-14-2013v2.pdf. 
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 A legitimate democracy requires a meaningful communicative 
connection between the governed and the government. By ensuring 
that government officials hear from, acknowledge, and respond to the 
populace, such a connection safeguards the distinctively democratic 
relationship between the governed and their government, to wit, that 
government is of, by, and for the people. In the United States today, 
governmental size, scale, and complexity – at all levels of government 
— make it difficult for the people to engage meaningfully and author-
itatively with government officials, elected or appointed. 
 
 On its face, lobbying might seem to remedy this problem because 
lobbying is a vehicle for members of the populace to access officials. 
But if lobbying is a vehicle practically available only to limited seg-
ments of the population, lobbying cannot rectify the anti-democratic 
tendencies of large modern governments, even those with genuinely 
democratic aspirations. Rather than making government more demo-
cratic, contemporary lobbying in the U.S. further diminishes the rep-
resentativeness of governments that have become disconnected from 
input from most of the populace. 
 
 In the U.S. today, the unequal distribution of lobbying leads to an 
unequal distribution of voice.  But it also leads to an unequal distri-
bution of listening. If elected officials allow it, all of their time would 
be filled by hearing from those who are motivated, organized, and 
well positioned to communicate with them. For both legal and practi-
cal reasons it makes no sense to legislate against people speaking 
with or otherwise communicating with officials. But there is nothing 
legally objectionable about an office holder rationing her time for re-
ceiving communications from different speakers.  Indeed a responsi-
ble democratic official should do even more to ensure that she listens 
to those who may not be able to get her attention as easily as more 
established, more powerful or more wealthy voices. She should be ac-
tively facilitating the speech of those from whom she otherwise would 
not hear. 
